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The views expressed in this preface are those of the Special Editor alone.
They in no way reflect agreement or consensus among the participants in the
symposium.
INTRODUCTION
I suspect that a prospective reader picking up this issue will likely have two
questions in mind: Is there any value in these essays, which, with the
exception of the Sobel and Zhang article, were written more than two years
ago; and second, is there any point talking about "an emerging framework of
civil law" when the carnage in Beijing on June 4, 1989, suggests that China's
leaders do not take the rule of law seriously? The answer to both questions is
"yes."
The issues raised and the conclusions drawn in the following translations
and papers, which have been amended only to the extent the authors thought
necessary, remain germane. The Supreme People's Court Opinion on the
General Principlest explained and expanded provisions but fundamentally
amended none. Gao Xi-Qing's analysis of how the education of China's
lawmakers and practitioners affected and shaped their legal thinking has been
validated by recent events. The debates on the extent to which exogenous
factors influence China's laws and legal culture and the theoretical disputes
on ownership and property rights continue unabated along essentially the
same lines. Registration of enterprise legal persons and formation of
partnerships have not halted, and the Economic Contract Law remains the
norm by which a range of domestic contract disputes are resolved. Finally,
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China retains a need to accelerate the accumulation and circulation of
domestic capital and the rate of foreign investment.
The military assault against its own citizens and the subsequent political
repression underscore the fact that the Chinese leadership has tended to
dispense with rule of law in matters of "counter-revolution" and serious
crime. Yet simultaneously the leadership has appeared to mount an effort,
one that was accelerating in the spring of 1989, to cure "legal blindness,"
foster a legal consciousness, and make the law a vehicle for redressing
administrative wrongs and resolving legal disputes. This bifurcated,
contradictory message is wonderfully illustrated by the lead articles in the
authoritative Legal System Daily (Fazhi ribao) two days after the killing in Beijing.
Next to an editorial conveying best wishes to the troops for "a job well done"
was a notice from the All China Lawyers' Correspondence Center. ' In the
spirit of the call at the October 1987 Thirteenth Party Congress to "grasp
economic reform and construction with one hand and law with the other," the
Center invited applicants for a three year course of study.
Unquestionably, as Bill Jones remarks in his postscript, the actions of the
Chinese Government in the summer and fall of 1989 engendered an abiding
cynicism about rule of law among civil law specialists. 2 Yet, the discussions of
property, ownership, and tort that filled legal periodicals before June 4 still
appeared afterwards albeit in somewhat more subdued tones. It may well be
that the leadership's more positive attitude toward civil law is instrumental
rather than deontological. Nonetheless, even if there is a re-centralization of
the economy and issues of property and ownership rights are left unresolved,
and even if no one sues the Public Security Bureau under the Administrative
Litigation Law for an improper detention,3 courts will continue to apply the
provisions of the General Principles and such special statutes as the Marriage
and Inheritance Laws to a myriad of cases. And it is as much out of these daily
interactions with the law as out of response to extraordinary measures that a
legal sensibility will grow in the People's Republic of China. Research and
publication on civil law will continue. But in the present environment,
substantive change will be slow, for theory will be less rapidly translated into
practice, and practice less rapidly recognized by law than before.
1. Fazhi ribao (Legal System Daily), June 5, 1989, at 1. On the All China Lawyers'
Correspondence Center, see Pitney, The Role of Legal Practitioners in the People's Republic of China, 24
STAN. J. INT'L L. 354 (1988).
2. Jones, Sources of Chinese Obligation Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1989, at 69, 92.
3. Arts. 2, 11.1. The Administrative Procedure Law (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng
susong fa) was passed by the second session of the Seventh National People's Congress on April 4,
1989, and according to article 75 shall take effect on October 1, 1990. Fazhi ribao, April 11, 1989, at
1. Article 42 of the Security Administration and Punishment Act also contains relevant provisions.
See Jin & Qiu, Xingzheng susong fudai minshi susong (Incidental Civil Action in Administrative Litigation),
FAXUE YANJIU (STUDIES IN LAW) 18 (No. 5, 1988); Wang, Gongan ganjing chuli Zhian anjian you cuowu
yingfu peichang zeren (Public Security Personnel Have a Responsibility to Make Compensation Because of Mistakes
in Handling Cases of Public Order), Legal System Daily, May 5, 1989, at 3.
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II
THE ARTICLES IN THE ISSUE
The issue opens with the translation of the General Principles by Whit Gray
and Henry Zheng. Although this has already appeared elsewhere, we reprint
it here for the convenience of readers seeking ready access to the provisions
cited by the authors of the papers. Gray and Zheng have also translated the
Opinion (For Trial Use) of the Supreme People's Court on Questions
Concerning the Implementation of the General Principles. Published in the
Bulletin of the Supreme Court on June 20, 1988, this document fills lacunae in the
General Principles and provides practical guidance. It fleshes out the rules on
guardianship, stipulates who is to be named party to the suit when an
individual industrial/commercial household or partnership becomes involved
in litigation, and provides guidelines for how a partnership should assume
liability or dissolve itself. On more routine matters, it clarifies the respective
rights of landlords and tenants and the rules on interest in private loans. The
Opinion stipulates that authors' unpublished work enjoys the protection of
copyright and lays out various standards and rules for tort-related cases. The
Opinion is often as telling in its omissions as in its content. For example,
while it discourses at length on article 83, which concerns itself with the rights
and interests of neighbors, it adds nothing to article 82, which, because it
describes the content of ownership, is central to the debates on how to
transform the character of state enterprises.
These debates obviously are not conducted in vacuo. Gao Xi-Qing
addresses the educational background of Chinese business and legal
personnel and its effect on their thinking. He categorizes these people
vertically by age and the training they received at a given time and
horizontally by the type of schooling they received. Seniors or veterans were
trained by the government in the 1950's. Juniors or mid-streamers were
trained between 1957 and 1966, in the years after the Sino-Soviet split and
before the Cultural Revolution. Together with the freshman or newcomers,
the "class" accepted into universities on the basis of academic rather than
political merit and trained in part overseas, the juniors are the key
policymakers. Between them are the sophomores, the worker-peasant-soldier
students who are now discriminated against because their admission to school
was based on correct ideological attitude or connections. However, Gao
emphasizes, regardless of when these people were educated or whether they
attended a law faculty at a university or a cadre training school, ideology or
politics (synonymous to Gao) suffused the curriculum and plays a large role in
the policy and laws they make. A correct theory under a legitimate name,
explains Gao, must always accompany change. Although there is a continuous
dialectic between the economic foundation and the political superstructure,
politics is always in command. In this environment, then, even substantive
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law is "the codification of the Party's policy and political needs." '4 As an
instrument, law cannot be too specific since both policy and political needs
constantly change. Only one policy is immutable according to Gao: the
achievement of a socialist society. China, he insists, is not moving toward
capitalism but down "a more flexible and, really, a more orthodox Marxist
road ... -5
While the politicized legal education described by Gao indubitably shaped
the substance of the General Principles, as Herbert Bernstein rightly points out,
it is also a pragmatic document in which explicit ideological hyperbole and
moralizing are largely absent. Indeed, he finds "the conceptual apparatus of
the General Principles . . . entirely familiar to a person trained in German law
.... "6 Bernstein distinguishes himself from civil law purists who are offended
that the Chinese enacted "first the retail and then the wholesale. ' 7 On the
one hand, he notes, even the systematic Germans enacted special legislation
as circumstances required before completing their Civil Code ("BGB"). And,
on the other hand, the work of Chinese drafters, unlike that of their German
predecessors, suffered constant interruptions by political turbulence.
Although Bernstein acknowledges that the General Principles lacks the System
orientation of the BGB, he does not regard it as inchoate. Rather, he regards
it as an example of the process in which the "(unarticulated or half-
articulated) principles" that underlie specific rules "can be molded into
statutory rules of a general character so as to inform the coherent
interpretation and application of previously enacted specific rules." 8 Thus, he
concludes, the Chinese may, through a building block method, be able to
construct a comprehensive civil code out of the General Principles and extant as
well as future special legislation. Two questions arise about this process:
First, will treatise writers and courts have a role, as in Europe, or will it be
reserved solely for the legislature; second, will the final product resemble the
BGB and the General Principles, a "lawyer's code" replete with abstract
concepts incomprehensible to those without special training, or will it be a
"citizen's code"? 9
Like Bernstein, Percy Luney characterizes the General Principles as
essentially non-ideological and as "fairly indistinguishable from European
civil codes."' 0 Drawing on the remarks of Whit Gray at the symposium,
Luney notes for example the similarities in the General Principles to Soviet
provisions on strict liability and on state enterprises' operational management
rights. Yet, Luney emphasizes, the spirit of the General Principles is Chinese, or
4. Gao, Today's Legal Thinking and Its Economic Impact in China, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1989, at 89, 113.
5. Id. at 110.
6. Bernstein, The PRC General Principles from a German Perspective, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1989, at 117, 128.
7. Id. at 121.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 127.
10. Luney, Traditions and Foreign Influences: Systems of Law in China and Japan, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1989, at 129, 139.
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as Gray put it, "a unique Chinese product with Soviet-style elements."''
Luney attributes much of the uniqueness not simply to socialism with Chinese
characteristics but also to the legacy (found in the Japanese practice of
administrative guidance as well) of the Confucian predilection for resolving
disputes through negotiation or mediation instead of litigation. However,
Luney stresses that in China, as in Japan, this less frequent reference to law
and use of lawyers is more common in domestic than international
transactions. Thus, "the Chinese legal system is bifurcated and shows a
different legal face to foreign enterprises."'' 2 Like Bill Jones, who writes that
the General Principles indicates that "the government and the Party have
decided to have China join the Western legal world,"' 13 Luney sees this
outward face as an expression of the Chinese Government's desire to have the
Chinese legal system "be acceptable to the international, particularly
Western, business community."' 4
In his examination of the evolution and characteristics of the General
Principles, Tong Rou, who participated in its drafting, emphasizes that while
foreign civil law concepts have in some measure shaped it, the General
Principles is a manifestation of a distinctively Chinese legislative style and
contains "clear-cut Chinese characteristics."' 5 Its object is the regulation of
socialist commodity relations, in particular horizontal property and economic
relations, among persons of equal status. Those relations that are not
between equal subjects, such as the vertical economic relations between a
ministry and its subordinate companies, Tong stresses, fall outside the scope
of civil law and should be regulated by complementary economic
administrative law. Concerned with the need for enterprise autonomy, Tong
examines the issues of ownership raised by articles 73 and 82. In his view,
even in the context of enterprises owned by the whole people, an ownership
that is "exclusive and unified,'' *6 the measure of the ownership right that is
the operational management right may be severed and granted to the
enterprise. This right is a new type that constitutes an independent right in
things.
Edward Epstein's contribution considers in detail the theoretical debates
over property, in which Tong Rou is a participant. Epstein's premise is that
notwithstanding the effort in the 1950's (described by Gao) to "shake off the
mantle of 'bourgeois' legal concepts," the theoretical system used in the
General Principles to define property relations is not Chinese but "borrowed
from Continental civil law."' 17 Still, as Epstein reminds us, the debates occur
11. Id. at 141.
12. Id. at 144.
13. Jones, supra note 2, at 90.
14. Luney, supra note 10, at 150.
15. Tong Rou, The General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC: Its Birth, Characteristics, and Role,
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1989, at 151, 156.
16. Id. at 169.
17. Epstein, The Theoretical System of Property Rights in China s General Principles of Civil Law:
Theoretical Controversy in the Drafting Process and Beyond, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1989, at 177,
178.
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in the singularly Chinese context of tensions between civil law theory, which
claims to encompass all commodity relations and limits economic law to
"those occasions when administrative law affects the application of civil law,"
and economic law theory, which limits civil law "to those economic relations,
usually consumption rather than production, outside the state plan."' 8
Though he faults the drafters of the General Principles for failing to take full
advantage of the creative opportunity afforded by substituting state property
owned by the whole people for state ownership, Epstein credits the theorists
for dividing ownership into powers and functions (article 71) so that they
could build amalgams of new rights. After reviewing ownership and property
rights related to ownership, 19 Epstein focuses on the effort of Chinese
scholars to create a theoretical analysis of property rights in the state
enterprise that will reduce administrative interference. Revolving around the
concept of the right of operative management, these all suffer because they
cannot remedy the fact that even though operative management may be a new
right in things, it remains a derivative right insufficient to exclude the state as
owner. Therefore, he notes, the theorists began to develop arguments for
increasing autonomy by issuing shares in, or "securitizing" (gufenhua),
enterprises.
Zhao Zhongfu's essay on the enterprise legal person should be read
beginning with the postscript, for there he explains how the 1988
Administrative Rules on Registration of Enterprise Legal Person have
replaced much of the legislation that he discussed earlier in the essay. This
new legislation, however, does not render the essay meaningless; it retains
value as a historical account of the evolution of the rules on the enterprise
legal person. Moreover, the Administrative Rules still leave open some of the
questions that provoked extended comment by symposium participants,
especially Jerome Cohen, who repeatedly pressed Zhao on how one could tell
if an enterprise or other unit was capable of independently assuming civil
obligations, the sine qua non for registration as a legal person. Tong Rou
suggested that articles 48 and 82 of the General Principles be read together to
understand civil obligations, while Zhao, in his paper and his response,
emphasized the importance of the enterprises' possession (emphasis added) of
its own property and the amount of the property. Still, even with the new
Administrative Rules, a troubling circularity remains. If an organization can
asssume civil obligations, it can be a legal person; a legal person is an
organization that can assume civil obligations. The condition and the result
are the same. 20 Under the Administrative Rules it may be easier to find out
which organizations are indeed legal persons, but discerning the basis for
18. Id. at 198 n.115.
19. In this section, Epstein explores the idea of contractual usufruct; but he notes in his
postscript that since the State Enterprise Law eliminated the right to receive benefit from its
definition of ownership (compare article 71 of the General Principles), usufruct may no longer be an
applicable concept. See id. Parts III, IV, and VI.
20. Fang, Minfa tongze pingxi (Critical Review of the General Principles), FAXUE YANJIU DONGTAI
(TRENDS IN THE STUDY OF LAW) § 37, at 10 (No. 12, June 28, 1988).
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approval of the registration remains difficult. It may simply be that decisions
are based on policy rather than careful investigation.
For Wang Liming, one of the theorists discussed by Epstein, and his co
author Liu Zhaonian, "[o]wnership is the key question not only in civil law but
also in all of law." 2 1 And, unlike Zhao, who appears willing to take article 82
at its face value, Wang and Liu contend that because article 82 grants merely
an operational management right rather than an ownership right, the
autonomy of the enterprise and its status as a legal person are compromised
by the state's ability to subordinate the operational management right to its
own administrative rights. They see the key issues as (1) why and on what
theoretical basis an enterprise has the right to possess, use, receive benefit
from, and dispose of property granted to it by the state, and (2) which rights
regarding this property the enterprise requires in order to achieve its
purposes. Trust in management, usufruct, total ownership right, leasing, and
responsibility contracts are reviewed and dismissed as appropriate theories of
enterprise property rights. Trust in management ignores the fact that the
property right is authorized from an administrative organ through a
relationship that is not an equal civil one. Because the enterprise cannot use
the property to benefit only itself, usufruct is not applicable. A socialist
economy cannot totally abolish the state's ownership right, and so forth.
Finally, they settle on the concept of stock equity. Wang and Liu acknowledge
the potential for the state, as the largest stockholder, to interfere, but
emphasize that the stock equity venture becomes a genuine legal person with
ownership rights while the state realizes its control through its position as
shareholder rather than as a matter of administrative right.
Partnership, Fang Liufang reminds us, has had a long history in China,
enduring into the early 1950's when China became the first socialist country
to recognize that joint operations between privately and publicly owned
organizations could "bridge the gap" between the two forms of ownership.22
When partnership forms re-emerged as part of the development of the
commodities economy, participants and theorists sought to create terms with
socialist characteristics, such as "cooperative operation organization," "new
economic association," and "joint household enterprise," in an effort to avoid
the term partnership, which was associated with the private economy. Fang
reviews the five major forms of partnership: laborers' co-op organizations,
80-90 percent of which were in fact individual partnerships and have been so
registered since the promulgation of the General Principles; individual
industrial/commercial households; 23 rural commodity economy associations
21. Wang & Liu, On the Property Rights System of the State Enterprises in China, LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1989, at 19, 42.
22. Fang, Chinese Partnership, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1989, at 43, 63.
23. In an article published before the symposium, Edward Epstein and Ye Lin examine these in
some detail and also explain why they prefer to call them enterprises rather than households.
Individual Enterprise in Contemporary Urban China:. A Legal Analysis of Status and Regulation, 21 INTERNAT'L
LAWYER 397 n.1 (1987). However, here, and throughout the issue, we have abided by the more
standard usage of "household."
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and peasant joint investment enterprises; jointly operated enterprises (lianying
qiye); and partnerships with foreign elements. Throughout his essay, Fang
draws our attention to the distinction between partnerships of natural
persons, partnerships of legal persons, and partnerships of natural and legal
persons. The first is a personal business association and is therefore dealt
with in the chapter in the General Principles on citizens, while the second is a
joint operation among legal persons and is covered in the chapter on legal
persons. The third category is covered neither in the General Principles nor in
the Opinion, but other legislation appears to permit it without, though,
clarifying the legal character of the hybrid organization. Fang, then, warns us
that the General Principles is not a comprehensive source of law on partnership
and that we must also search for the law in economic regulations and policies.
William Jones' contribution on obligations law echoes Fang's view that to
understand Chinese civil law one must look beyond the General Principles to the
special statutes as well. This advice is true not only because the General
Principles has no mechanism for applying its principles to matters it leaves
uncovered, but also because the General Principles is a less accurate reflection of
Chinese legal reality. Jones suggests focusing instead on such legislation as
the Economic Contract Law, 24 which gives less scope than the General Principles
to "the exercise of the will (by means of the juristic act)" and greater emphasis
"to direction by superior authorities often by means of the plan."-25 Thus,
where the General Principles is imbued with freedom of contract, the Economic
Contract Law "is based on the idea that parties only enter into obligation
relations that are permitted by the state and frequently only as they are
directed by government officials." 2 6 He sees the same heavy administrative
hand active in tort litigation. In any case, Jones agrees with Luney that most
disputes are resolved by mediation and negotiation without reference to the
General Principles, the Economic Contract Law, or other sources of law.
Moreover, like Epstein, Jones fears that with economic reforms under attack
and the resurgence of centralized economic planning, there will be a
diminished role for civil law, as it is reduced from the "big civil law" of the
General Principles that governs relations between all "persons" to the "small
civil law ' ' 27 (or, as one Chinese scholar called it, "mom and pop law' ' 28
(gonggong popo fa)) that governs only private relations between individual
humans. 29
Phyllis Chang's paper on adjudicating responsibility contract disputes
delineates an instance of the Economic Contract Law at work, although as she
notes, the rural responsibility contract system differs from other reforms in
24. Jones himself prefers to translate this legislation as Economic Contracts Law but agreed to
drop the plural to achieve consistency with the other authors in the issue.
25. Jones, supra note 2, at 78.
26. Id. at 79.
27. Id. at 74.
28. Jiao, Ainfa yu shangpin jingi xin :hLvxu (Civil Law and the New Order of Commodity Economy), Legal
System Daily, October 19, 1988, at 3.
29. Jones, supra note 2, at 74.
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that it was implemented not through laws and regulations but rather "virtually
entirely through Party policy," 30 a body of norms that courts do not
distinguish from state policy. Hence, in this instance, while the theories in
articles 27, 28, 80, and 81 lay the legal foundation and statutorily legitimate
existing legal practice, "they seem destined to have little impact" on that
practice. 3 1 Chang demonstrates that other than the Economic Contract Law,
which has emerged as a "major decisional guide," 32 the norms used by the
courts to guide their handling of cases are first and foremost Party policies.
Courts, she notes, still prefer to base decisions on the Economic Contract Law
or administrative regulations if these do not contravene policy because
legislation is more specific and because peasants think law is more immutable
and thus more likely to protect their contracts. However, courts frequently
turn disputes over to administrative organizations to settle, and, in the final
analysis, even in the courts, law remains subordinate to policy.
At the close of his paper on torts, Ye Lin notes a similar phenomenon,
namely that because judges do not have sufficient authority under the law to
deal with civil cases of tort involving liability to compensate, those cases are
often dealt with by means of administrative measures rather than through the
courts. Ye's historical review of the tort system in China shows that torts were
resolved in connection with criminal proceedings since criminal law was
"designed to protect the interests of society as a whole." 3 3 Although the tort
concepts in the General Principles and in the Opinion signal a break from the
1950's tradition of dependency on Soviet principles and structure, most
notably a willingness to consider compensation for mental (that is, non-
material) injury, as Ye's cases of defective products indicate, it remains
unclear whether criminal and administrative principles or civil law principles
of tort and contract will control. 34 As Randy Edwards observed in his
comments on Ye's paper, the ultimate problem may be that most defendants
are judgment-proof. Other than the state, suits against which confront
formidable obstacles, there are no deep pockets in China.
The final two papers by Feinerman, and Sobel and Zhang, consider how to
mobilize and regulate domestic investment and how to insure, under the
newly emerging thinking about property rights, the security of foreign
investment. Feinerman examines the reform of the banking system, and,
through an analysis of the Interim Regulations on Administration of
Enterprise Bonds and the Xiamen Rules on Management of Shares and
Bonds, the creation of a securities market. The banking reforms, which have
been less controversial since they do not impinge on questions of ownership,
aim to replace direct assignment of funds to enterprises with bank loans. The
problem here is that China's central bank, the People's Bank of China, may
30. Chang, Deciding Disputes: Factors That Guide Chinese Courts in the Adjudication of Rural
Responsibility Contract Disputes, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1989, at 101, 107.
31. d. at Ill.
32. Id. at 112.
33. Ye Lin, The Tort System in China, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1989, at 143, 145.
34. See also Jones, supra note 2, at 74.
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have a conflict of interest since it controls not only the banks which make
loans but also the enterprises' access to alternative sources of capital such as
the issuance of debentures or shares. Feinerman sees a preference in the
rules for bonds because they avoid ownership issues. But even if an
enterprise issues shares, what will be the percentage opened to "public"
ownership, and, will the public want to buy them? Wang Liming, a proponent
of shareholding, remarked during discussion that while academics think
issuing stocks will stimulate workers who will then consider state-owned
property as their own, workers themselves see stocks as risky and are reluctant
to invest.
Sobel and Zhang demonstrate that the domestic debates among civil law
theorists on the nature of ownership have practical consequences for foreign
investors who have had to look for other forms of security as China has
reduced the availability of credit guarantees. Taking Occidental's An Tai Bao
coal project as a case study, the authors first examine project finance as a way
to collateralize foreign loans. The problem for the Chinese borrower was that
to grant a security interest in the form of the physical assets of the project and
the benefits that flowed therefrom, it had to "own the property and have the
rights under Chinese law to grant such an interest. ' 35 Since under China's
Constitution mineral rights are owned by all the people and since the project
lacked legal person status, it had to obtain special permission to grant the
foreign partner the right to participate in the exploitation of the coal and to
assign that right to lenders as collateral. After the April 1988 revision of the
Constitution to allow individuals to trade land-use rights for compensation
and the subsequent promulgation in Shanghai, 36 Shenzhen, and Hainan of
facilitating regulations, grantees of land-use rights could use them as
collateral for mortgages. 37  While the authors assess these measures
positively, they conclude that the deficiencies in the law concerning secured
transactions reflect the difficulty China has in trying to remain socialist while
attracting foreign investment by allowing the use of property-based collateral.
III
THEMES
The issues addressed and the questions both raised and answered in these
essays cannot be intelligently reviewed in a brief space, so I have taken the
35. Sobel & Zhang, The Evolution of Foreign Secured Lending in China: Socialism and Property, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1989, at 185, 195.
36. Zhang's translation of the Measures of the Shanghai Municipality on Compensated Transfer
of Land Use Rights is appended to the article. See id. App.
37. Sobel and Zhang compare this practice to the Anglo-American ground lease, but it is not
without precedent in China. During the eighteenth and nineteenth century, tenants in Jiangsu
Province (along the central coast athwart the Yangtze River) acquired surface rights to the land they
tilled. While the landlord retained the fundamental sub-soil right, so long as rent was paid, he could
not prevent the tenant from assigning or sub-letting the surface soil rights. See JAMIESON, CHINESE
FAMILY AND COMMERCIAL LAW 108 (1921).
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liberty of focusing on four themes that I feel unite this volume and tie it to
current Chinese periodical literature.
A. "Chineseness"
Within this category are really two sub-themes: first, whether the forces
driving legal change are internal or external; and second, whether the General
Principles is derivative or distinctively Chinese. Bill Jones describes China's
establishment of a civil law regime as in some measure reflective of its desire
to "join the Western legal world," 3 8 while Percy Luney adds that China
wanted in particular to have its legal system be acceptable to the Western
business community. 39 There is some merit to this argument, but it makes
more sense when applied to trade and investment law than to civil law. As Jim
Feinerman observes, legislation on joint ventures "engendered the very
institution which the law [had] been created to regulate." 40  And the
metamorphosis of the Economic Contract Law, through its incarnation in
Shenzhen to its final stage as the Foreign Economic Contract Law, reflects
Chinese sensitivity and accommodation to international customary practices
and expectations. 4'
In many ways this question of the "foreign impact, Chinese response" is
reminiscent of discussions about nineteenth-century Chinese history. But, as
Joseph Cheng argued some time ago, the legal reforms implemented in the
late ninteenth and early twentieth century by the Qing Dynasty were more a
function of an internal dynamic than external demands. 42 Through much of
the nineteenth century, a group of Qng officials had sought reform. In the
last quarter of the century, some of them began to look outside for alternative
or supplemental solutions. Similarly, one can argue, as does Tong Rou, that
the General Principles is basically a product of the reform of the Chinese
economic system. 43 This assertion in no way precludes the argument that the
drafters studied and drew on Western legal theory. Rather, it emphasizes that
whatever national elements are present in the Chinese civil law, the impetus
for its creation was fundamentally indigenous. Indubitably, though, the
promulgation of the General Principles, the declaration in October 1987 that
China was still in a preliminary stage of socialism permitting co-existence with
private economy, and the constitutional amendment that legimitized private
38. Jones, supra note 2, at 90.
39. Luney, supra note 10, at 150.
40. Feinerman, Backwards into the Future, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1989, at 169.
41. Zheng, A Comparative Analysis of the Foreign Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China,
3 CHINA LAW REP. 227-57 (Summer 1986); Xie, Xin zhonggude hetong zhidu he hetongfa (The Contract
System and the Contract Law in the New China), STUDIES IN LAW 64 (No. 4, 1988).
42. Cheng, Chinese Law in Transition: The Late Ch'ing Law Reform, 1901 11 (Ph.D. diss.
Brown University 1976).
43. Tong, Guanyu "AMinfa Tongze" ruogan wentide tantao (An Inquiry into Several Questions Concerning
the General Principles), FAXUE ZAZHI (LAw MAGAZINE) 4, 5 (No. 5, 1988).
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enterprise-all heightened the prestige of Western law and facilitated
borrowing from it. 4 4
Far clearer is the hybrid character of the General Principles itself. While
acknowledging the "Chinese characteristics" it comprises, Bernstein, Luney,
Epstein, andJones unambiguously delineate the Germanic basis of the General
Principles. Indeed, Jones, who in remarks at the symposium and in other
written work45 emphasizes the impact of the Civil Code of the Republic of
China and of treatise writers in Taiwan, suggests that the combined influences
from the Soviet Union, Japan, and Taiwan magnify the German effect.
In both his symposium paper and oral remarks and then in an article
published eight months after the symposium, 46 Tong Rou stressed the
singularly Chinese nature of the General Principles. Moreover, in his
subsequent article he recalled, with, I would argue, a somewhat frustrated
tone, the discussions at the symposium about foreign influences on the General
Principles. "Some said," he wrote, "that the General Principles is similar to
Taiwan's Civil Code; others said it had the same lineage as the Soviet Civil
Code; and still others claimed that it had been 'cooked up' on the basis of the
German Code."' 47 Tong acknowledged that there was no need for each
country to remake the civil law anew and that consequently one country's civil
law frequently included not only the customary terms and logic of civil law
(for example, ownership rights, obligation, and legal person) but also traces
of other countries' civil law. Nonetheless, he insisted that the General Principles
is a product of Chinese experience and uses unique terms: individual
partnership, individual industrial and commercial household, and joint
operation. For Tong, the key to comprehending the distinctively national
character of a civil code is to consider broadly the social structure, all political
economic phenomena, and the entire legal system. To look at one country's
civil law as simply another's, he concluded, is to see the trees but not the
forest.
We must go beyond simply descrying foreign concepts and begin to
identify specifically where they are evident and where they have been rejected;
the participants in the symposium have done that. But to go still further, to
discover why some ideas were accepted and others rejected is not, because of
inaccessible sources, always possible. Epstein's analysis of the theoretical
debates on ownership is exemplary, and we must, to the extent sources permit
us, build on it. Why, for example have the Chinese abandoned the Soviet
hostility toward compensation for mental (that is, non-material) injury?48 In
44. Epstein, supra note 17, at 212-14; Jones, Some Questions Regarding the Significance of the General
Provisions of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, 28 HARV. INTERNAT'L L. J. 331 (1987).
45. Jones, supra note 44, at 331 n.1 13.
46. See Tong, supra note 43, at 5.
47. Id..
48. On June 24, 1988, page 3 of the Legal System Daily was devoted to essays on compensation
for mental injury (tingshen sunhai) under article 120 of the General Principles. See also Guan, Shilun
jingshen sunhai peichang shuede queding wenti (The Problem of Determining the Extent of Compensation for
Mental Injury), STUDIES IN LAW 64-69 (No. 3, 1989); and Yang, Tan dui qinhai gongmin mingyuquan
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his discussion of the tort case involving the women's hygiene product, Ye Lin
notes that Chinese plaintiffs commonly sue to obtain restoration of "face" and
reputation rather than for economic compensation. 49 Yet, as the provisions
of the General Principles and Opinion and the briefs of some complainants
illustrate, there is a recognition that in a socialist commodity economy, even
"face" and reputation are "commodities" on which a monetary value can be
placed.
B. Law and Economic Change
In the initial pages of his essay, Jim Feinerman deftly articulates the
question of the relationship between legal and economic change by describing
the dilemma Chinese leaders have faced since 1978: Should they wait for
"manifestations of economic behavior which require legislative control before
legislating . . . or . . . attempt to legislate new economic arrangements into
existence?" 50 Because China's "statist political order will not allow any new
actor to emerge in the economy without explicit authorization from the state,"
argues Feinerman, China's leaders have followed the latter path. Rather than
imposing legal regulation after economic developments have necessitated it,
they have acted on the assumption that by drafting legislation, for example,
the joint venture laws, they can specifically create "wholly new economic
institutions which presumably would not [have] otherwise arise[n]." 5'
Feinerman's characterization of Chinese tendencies notwithstanding, at
least one Chinese scholar directly involved in the drafting of legislation deems
lawmakers excessively reactive. In a June 1988 article, 52 Yuan Jianguo, then
working in the Law Bureau (fazhyu) of the State Council, complained that
there was too much emphasis on confirming the results of reform and
insufficient awareness of the role of legislation in encouraging and leading
reform. He also noted that the necessity for compromise diminished the
"scientific character" of legislation. Thus, for example, the rules regulating
prices functioned poorly because they did not rigorously address the root
causes of inflation.
Yuan's remarks prompt two observations. First, legislation that confirms
can also encourage and lead. A company law, for instance, would build on the
legal provisions of the General Principles and the existing corporate forms of the
commodities economy, but by resolving a host of critical questions relating to
ownership and operation rights, corporate liability, shareholding, and
corporate structure, it would also create a new legal environment. 53 All of
anjiande shenli (On Trying Cases of Infringement of Citizens Right to Reputation), LAW MAGAZINE 32 (No. 6,
1987).
49. Ye, supra note 33, at 161-62.
50. Feinerman, supra note 40, at 170.
51. Id. at 169.
52. Yuan Jianguo, jianli shehuizhuyi shangpin jingi xin zhixude guanjian shi fazhi jianshe (The Ke, to
Establishing the New Order of Socialist Commodities Economy is Legal Construction), STUDIES IN LAw 3 (No. 6,
1988).
53. Tong, Fazhan shangpin jingii jviu jianli jianquan gongsi lifa (Establishing Complete Corporate
Legislation is Essential to Developing a Commodities Economy), Legal System Daily, July 28, 1989, at 3.
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these are preeminently political questions that will have to be considered first
by the leadership in the Party, and this fact leads to my second observation:
When a legal specialist criticizes legislation as lacking "scientific character,"
he means that it was shaped more by ideologues than by specialists. 54
Indeed, as Phyllis Chang demonstrates in her study of rural reform, it was
not law but an explicit authorization from the state in the form of a policy
decision that initiated the responsibility contract system. Returning to
Feinerman's point, we see that policy, as well as law, can create new economic
institutions that would not otherwise have existed. However, in the
countryside and subsequently in the cities, rapidly evolving innovative forms
outgrew the original policy decisions and legal provisions. Experiments were
given policy permission but lacked a legal basis until they proved successful. 55
In many respects, the civil law embodied in the General Principles is the legal
basis that confirms and safeguards existing economic relations.
Characterizations of the process vary, however. Tong emphasizes that the
General Principles is "an abstraction of the rules . . . that exist beneath"
economic phenomena and not just "a summation of the discrete experimental
results of economic reform." 56 Chang, on the other hand, describes the
General Principles as statutorily legitimating existing practice. 57 It may well be
that the Chinese leaders' decisions about whether to use law to initiate or
legitimate after the fact relate to the nature of the change. For example, until
recently they permitted forms of private enterprise in the secondary and
tertiary sectors to evolve naturally and relatively unfettered (since regulating
these after the fact is less unseemly for socialists than consciously creating
private control of the means of production where it had not previously
existed). 58 Yet, new corporate forms and a national securities exchange, both
of which potentially impinge on ownership of large-scale state enterprises,
will undoubtedly be instituted by legislation, then reformed and regulated
54. Yuan, himself, does not phrase it this way, but he opens his essay with a lament that in the
past reform had depended too much on policy. See supra note 50.
55. Tong, supra note 43. Courts themselves must also innovate in the absence of relevant
statutes. The Economic Chamber of the Nanjing Intermediate People's Court had no legal basis for
not accepting cases of bankrupt collective enterprises, joint operations, and individual partnerships,
but also had no legal basis for trying them since the Bankruptcy Law applies only to state enterprises.
Nonetheless the court drew on the General Principles and the Bankruptcy Law to devise a process of
liquidation that satisfied all creditors. Fei quanmin suoyouzhi qiye pochan anjian ruhe shenli (How to
Adjudicate Cases of Bankruptc, Involving Enterprises That Are Not State-owned), Legal System Daily, May 30,
1989, at 3.
56. Tong, supra note 15, at 166.
57. Chang, supra note 30, at 110.
58. Although there was no legislation concerning private enterprise until the spring of 1988, by
the end of 1987 there were between 200,000 and 300,000 private enterprises in China employing
nearly four million people. Most had evolved out of the individual industrial and commercial
households ("IICH's") and hired between eight and thirty workers. Wang & Sun, Lun Siying qiyede
xingzhi, tezheng, hefa'i diwei (On the Nature, Characteristics, and Legal Status of Private Enterprises), STUDIES
IN LAW 17-23 (No. 1, 1989). On the line between IICH's and private enterprises, see Fang, supra note
22, at 51-52, 65. On the slowing of privatization after June 1989, see Feinerman, supra note 40, at
182.
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anew as the state responds to the unintended consequences of the new
economic arrangements it has initiated.
Driving and shaping the relationship of legal and economic change is the
dynamic of dialectical materialism, which describes the interaction between
the economic foundation of society and the superstructural elements of law
and politics. As Gao Xi-Qng reminds us, for most of the Chinese Communist
Party's history, politics took command over economics. 59 Mao considered
that the human will could overcome objective circumstances, that
revolutionary consciousnessness could achieve a socialist revolution
regardless of the appropriateness of the economic circumstances. Thus, in
China, orthodoxy is somewhat heterodox in classical Marxist terms, while
orthodox Marxism, that is, giving primacy to improving the material
conditions of the people, is, depending on the political tenor of the times,
revisionist or reformist. Whether law will lead or follow economic change will
depend in large measure on the magnitude of the change and on where in its
arc the theoretical pendulum happens to be.
C. Theory, Policy, and Law
Since first being propounded by the fifteenth-century philosopher Wang
Yangming, the theory of the unity of knowledge and action has been central
to much of Chinese thinking. Wang meant that knowledge of a principle is
genuine only if it were expressed in action, and he would certainly find no
argument among Chinese raised on an educational diet that emphasized
praxis. Yet in China today, it is equally true that every action must have a
theoretical basis, for, as Edward Epstein notes, ideology has been relied on by
leaders to "mold all manner of social activity." 60 Or, as Gao Xi-Qng puts it, a
correct theory under a legitimate name must always accompany change. 6 1
The linkage of theory, policy, and law stands out especially clearly in the
debates about the nature of ownership and ownership rights. Some form of
collective or public control of the means of production is at the core of
socialism. Some flexibility, such as the land-use rights described by Sobel and
Zhang, may be acceptable. Indeed, Sobel and Zhang's assertion that the
"Chinese concept of property has been transformed from something owned
by the state for the good of the people to something selectively available for
use in commerce" 6 2 rings reasonably true so long as we emphasize the word
"selectively." However, "a correct theory under a legitimate name" that
would allow transformation of the ownership of state enterprises by, for
example, "securitization" has not yet been developed. 63 And, given the
statements of Li Peng in the fall of 1989, such change appears farther away
59. Gao, supra note 4, at 108 & 109.
60. Epstein, supra note 17, at 179.
61. Gao, supra note 4, at 108.
62. Sobel & Zhang, supra note 35, at 212.
63. Id. at 187. Sobel and Zhang note that to reconcile experiments in private ownership with
socialist theory, socialist views on the role of property must be modified.
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than ever. For Prime Minister Li, the central task of reform is to invigorate
publicly owned enterprises by attacking their rigid management system, not
by changing their socialist nature. While he conceded a need to"give proper
play to the regulatory role of the market in the process of economic reform,"
Li insisted that China would never abandon an economy based on socialist
public ownership. 64 One of the most intriguing examples of the extent to
which legislators rest their rules on Marxist theory is Fang Liufang's
discussion of the dividing line between individual industrial and commercial
households and private enterprises. Fang locates the standard in Marx's
discussion in Das Kapital of how much surplus value a boss must extract from
his workers' surplus labor in order to become a capitalist. 65 The following
few lines, in which Marx alludes to guilds' futile efforts to constrain successful
masters' inexorable transformation into capitalists, also speak to
contemporary events. Marx's analysis prefigures the present regime's
struggle to redirect the economic change that has grown naturally out of the
economic reforms, whenever that change appears to threaten preconceived
ideological beliefs.
Precisely because of these rapid changes, the Chinese leadership has
shown a predilection to rely on policy rather than on law. At the symposium,
Tong Rou cited a dispute between two provinces that was settled not as a
matter of law but as a matter of policy. The danger in this of course is (as the
Chinese students seeking a law rather than an administrative decision on
immigration pointed out) that policy changes more rapidly than law.
Moreover, Phyllis Chang notes, "the lines between law and policy blur when
courts apply policy guidelines." 66 This equation of policy to legal rules
manifests itself particularly clearly when courts refer to Party and government
policies as policy regulations (zhengce guiding). Indeed, some cadres think that
Party policy can be substituted for state law. And, according to one
commentator, so long as enduring traditional attitudes continue to make
people more inclined to suffer unrighted wrongs than to go to law, it will be
difficult to remove law from the shadow of power. 67
64. Jin Q, llihv China 11W Not Practice Privatization, BEIJING REV., Sept. 4-10, 1989, at 7-9.
Speaking at the November 1989 Duke Symposium, "Marxism and China's Reforms: Ideological
Controversies and Contradictions," Su Shaozhi, the former director of the Institute of Marxism
Leninism Mao Zedong Thought at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, charged that most
socialist countries have not socialized the means of production but "statized" them by inserting the
state between the means of production and the workers. He contends that socialism does not equal
state ownership but allows for a mixed economy dominated by co-operative forms.
65. Fang, supra note 22, at 65.
66. Chang, supra note 30, at 138.
67. Li, Why Laws Go Unenforced, BEUING REV., Sept. 11-17, 1989, at 17.
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D. Personhood, State, and Society
Running through the General Principles, this set of articles, and even articles
published after June 468 is the idea that the key to a system of civil law is the
autonomy and equality of individual actors, whether they are natural or legal
persons. Personhood is the state or fact of being such an autonomous, equal
person, and at issue in China today is how the interests of the state and society
impinge on personhood.
As civil law, the General Principles governs the civil activities of, and
relations between, subjects of equal status. Article 5 stipulates that "the lawful
rights and interests of citizens and legal persons" are protected by law against
violation by any organization or individual. Chapter 5 defines these rights as
well as the concomitant obligations, while chapter 6 defines the civil liabilities
that may arise from the violation of those rights or the failure to perform
obligations. Thus, the civil law system that the General Principles erects is an
individualistic world governed by the decisions of individual persons who
acquire "rights" through juristic acts. 69 As Tong Rou emphasizes, relations
that are not between equal subjects do not fall within the regulatory scope of
civil law, 70 yet it is precisely those vertical relations between, on the one hand,
the subjects of the civil law and, on the other, the administrative and
governmental bodies above them that may well determine the efficacy of the
civil law system in China. China is not yet a society in which individuals with
independent wills enter freely into relationships. 7 1
Both before and after the promulgation of the General Principles, one of the
chief vehicles for monitoring unwarranted interference in civil relations by
superior agencies has been the press. Indeed, the Thirteenth Party Congress
in October 1987 initiated a policy of "supervision by public opinion" (yulun
jiandu), whereby the mass media were to help the public understand
government and public affairs and "any activity that may impinge on its
interests." 72 As debate arose as to whether the media are both spokespersons
for the people and vehicles for political participation and deliberation, or
merely reflectors of views without any formal brief as the people's agent, 73
newspapers took the new policy as a mandate to expose and control as much
as to educate. Their supervision, however, has for the most part been at lower
governmental levels, and their reporters are increasingly being sued for libel
and slander by the government officials whom they attempt to "supervise. ' 74
68. Zhou & Zhou, Zouchu minfade -hong shii (Coming Out of Civil Law's Middle Ages), Legal System
Daily, June 13, 1989, at 3 (civil law affirms the citizen's autonomy in regard to private life ...
individual self-rule is the precondition for society's self-rule).
69. Jones, supra note 2, at 70, 71.
70. Tong, supra note 15, at 156.
71. Jones, supra note 2, at 73.
72. Sun, Yulun jiandu yu xinwen fazhi (Supervision by Public Opinion and Press Law), Legal System
Daily, December 31, 1988, at 1.
73. Gao, Yulunjiandu -hongdefalu wenti (Legal Questions in Supervision by Public Opinion), MINZHU YU
FAZHI (DEMOCRACY AND LAW) 31 (No. 11, 1988).
74. Sun, supra note 72.
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"Supervision by public opinion" is clearly not a systematic solution to the
problem of administrative interference in the lawful civil acts of legal and
natural persons, especially when this interference causes economic damages.
Commentators have argued that government agencies must be held
responsible not before the bar of public opinion but before the bar ofjustice.
Not only were persons to be provided with avenues of redress through which
agencies' decisions could be voided; the agencies were also to bear civil
liability. The reform goal of a commodity economy in which "the state
regulates the market, and the market leads enterprises" could not be achieved
if enterprises were constantly subjected to direct administrative interference
rather than permitted to become relatively independent operators and
producers of commodities. 75
Recognizing the need to address this problem, the National People's
Congress passed on April 4, 1989, the PRC Law on Administrative
Procedure,76 which is scheduled to take effect on October 10, 1990. As used
by the law, administrative procedure means that people's courts judge and
resolve suits brought by citizens, legal persons, or other organizations against
an administrative organization (or its personnel) that has allegedly violated
their lawful rights and interests. The violations, which are specified in article
11 include, inter alia, suspensions of permits and licenses and invasions of the
operating autonomy right (ingying zizhu quan). The point of this law,
according to one commentator, is to eliminate the ideas that "[those] below
cannot accuse [those] above" and that "the people (min) may not accuse
officials." ' 77 Or, as another article published the same day put it, to "smash
the idea that officials rule the people, but the people may not accuse the
officials." 78
Given the post-June 4 attitude of the Chinese leadership toward
autonomous actors, it is not clear what the effect of this legislation will be
once it is implemented. Yet, its passage underscores the effort of proponents
of a civil law regime to defend personhood against the intercessions and
depredations of the state, and recent legal periodicals have continued to
publish the sort of exegetical articles that suggest the law will take effect on
schedule. 79 Ironically, on June 6, 1989, a front page article in Fazhi ribao
discussed the new law. 80 It instructed its readers that if they felt a permit had
been wrongly suspended or property improperly confiscated, or if they felt
75. Chen, Shangpin jingi xia xingzheng/a mianlinde xin keti (The New Object Facing Administrative Law
Under a Commodity Economy), Legal System Daily, August 24, 1988, at 3. See also Jin & Qiu, supra note
3; Xie, Lun guoying qiye chengbao hetong yu zulin hetong (On Contracting Out and Leasing Out of State
Enterprises), LAW MAGAZINE 4 (No. 4, 1988).
76. Legal System Daily, April 11, 1989, at 1.
77. Suo, Xingzheng susongfa jiqi shivongfanwei (The Administrative Procedure Law and the Scope of its
Application), Legal System Daily, May 5, 1989, at 3.
78. Wang, supra note 3. at 3.
79. Zhang & Wang, Lun xingzhengpeichang (On Administrative Compensation), LAW MAGAZINE 14-16
(No.1, 1990); Tang & Jiang, -Xingzheng susongfa" hongde laojiao he shourong shencha (Internment and
Rehabilitation Through Labor in the Administrative Procedure Law), id. at 23.
80. Legal System Daily, June 6, 1989, at 1.
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that they had been unfairly detained, fined, or even subjected to rehabilitation through
labor (laojiao),8' they could bring a suit against the offending administrative
agency. Of course one wonders, even if the law had been in effect, how many
detainees would have brought suit.
Our focus has been on the tension between the state and personhood, but
there are also conflicts between the interests of persons and those of society
and between the interests of disparate persons. Indeed, since the
promulgation of the General Principles, there has been an increase in tort
actions brought under the provisions on civil liabilities. Not surprisingly,
scholarly debate on torts has also developed over such questions as no fault
liability and the coincidence of liabilities. At the center of these exchanges are
familiar questions: What are the relative weights that should be accorded the
interests of the individual as against those of society; and, how much latitude
should the injured party have in choosing a cause of action?82
Some of the most widely publicized tort cases recently have revolved
around the question of the right to one's likeness. The narrow legal issue has
more often than not been the question of whether the likeness was used for
the purpose of profit without the permission of the person whose likeness it
is.83 For example, in late 1988 a young woman who had been paid to model
nude for a painting class at a well known arts institute sued the painter both
for displaying the painting at an exhibition, for which an admission fee was
charged, and for using the painting as the cover of the exhibition catalogue,
which was on sale to attendees. At a January 1989 symposium organized by
the Law Department at People's University to discuss the case,8 4 participants
focused on application and interpretation of statutes, but the sub-text seemed
to be other issues: Should the property rights of the painter or the personal
rights of the model be given primary protection; had the model made an
informed decision; if so, should she assume responsibility for the
consequences of her own actions (namely, the public ridicule to which a
society not accustomed to such painting had subjected her)?
The Shanghai courts are now dealing with a case that even more directly
impinges on the problem of balancing the interests of society, in this instance,
81. Id. (emphasis added). Rehabilitation through labor (laojiao) is an administrative punishment,
essentially one of prolonged detention, which may be imposed by the Public Security Bureau.
Although the acts that lead to its imposition are not considered to constitute crimes, reform through
education can involve incarceration for up to three years. SeeJ. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS IN
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1963, at 238-74 (1968); AMNESTY INTERNAT'L, POLITICAL
IMPRISONMENT IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 80-83, 89-91 (1978); Tang &Jiang, supra note 79.
Prior to the Administrative Procedure Law, mistakes, both intentional and accidental, in sentencing
could be appealed only through the Public Security Bureau itself. Id.
82. Tong, Lun qinquan xingwei zhidude yanbian he fazhan quxiang (On the Direction in the Evolution and
Development of the System of Tort), STUDIES IN LAW 48 (No. 1, 1989); Wang & Dong, Hetong zeren yu
qinquan zeren jingide bijiao Yaiyiu (Comparative Research on the Coincidence ofLiabilitiesfor Tort andfor Breach
of Contract). id. at 74.
83. See articles 100, 101, and 120 of the General Pnciples and articles 139, 140, 150. and 151 of
the Opinion for the relevant statutory provisions.
84. Li, .1Iote "gaozhuang" yu xiaoxiangquande faln baohu (The Model's Complaint and Legal Protection of
the Right to Ones Likeness), Legal System Daily, January 25, 1989, at 3.
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the advance of medical knowledge, against the interests of a person, in this
instance, the preservation of privacy. 85 The plaintiff, a twenty-eight-year-old
woman, brought suit against a doctor of traditional Chinese medicine who
twenty-two years before had cured her of a disfiguring eye disease. At issue
was the nature of his use of her "before" and "after" photographs. They had
appeared in a book he had published at his own expense and in an article for
which he was paid 10 RMB (roughly US $2.70). The writer who reported this
suit, in which the court's decision in the plaintiff's favor and award of 60 RMB
in damages was on appeal by the doctor, bemoaned the deleterious effect such
wrong-headed decisions would have on the dissemination of medical
knowledge. If individual privacy was favored to this extent over the interests
of society, further lamented the writer, the police would need permission of
suspects to distribute their pictures in wanted posters, and television news
would have to obtain permission from every person in a crowd shot before
broadcasting it.86 Undoubtedly, many of the participants in the spring 1989
demonstrations would support such an interpretation.
In a society in which until the 1980's assumption of personal responsibility
was a rarity, affixing that responsibility today remains problematical. Again,
though, many of the issues are not that foreign. When a ticket-taker on a bus
knowingly falsely accuses a passenger of failing to purchase a ticket, thereby
causing the passenger to sustain injury when the ticket-taker and fellow
employees (acting naively at the behest of the ticket-taker) attempt to restrain
the passenger and search her for payment, should the ticket-taker, the fellow
employees, and/or the bus company bear the responsibility?8 7 When a
person is injured by his own water buffalo--albeit one provoked when a
neighbor ignored warnings and walked his own animal nearby-should the
neighbor or the injured party assume the consequent medical expenses?, In
this instance, the General Principles makes a decision difficult not because it is
insufficiently detailed but because it is too specific. 89
It is probably this sort of case, as well as a concern about adversarial
lawyers and their contingency fees, that Tong Rou had in mind when he
suggested at the symposium that the tort system in China might do better to
model itself on the New Zealand pattern of social insurance rather than on the
85. Tian, Xinwen zhongde "guangao"? (A Aewspaper "Advertisement"?), DEMOCRACY AND LAW 33-34
(No. 11, 1989).
86. Id. at 34.
87. ZHONGGUO GAOJI FAGUAN PEIXUN ZHONGXIN JIAOYANSHI, 2 MINSHI FALU ZHUANYE JIAOXUE
ANLIXUAN (SELECTION OF CASES FOR INSTRUCTION IN THE CIVIL LAW SPECIALTY) 36 (November 1988).
88. Id. at 34. For another case that touches on similar issues but with a slightly different fact
situation, see Xu, Zheqi dongwu shangren 'an ying yousheifu minshi zeren (Who Should Bear Civil Liability in
This Case of an Animal Injuring a Person), LAW MAGAZINE 44 (No. I, 1990).
89. One viewpoint on settling this case argued that since article 127 stipulates the owner or
person in charge of an animal bear liability if it causes injury to another, the neighbor had no liability
since it was the plaintiff's own animal that had caused the injury. See supra note 87, at 34. Although
the Opinion offers no specific clarification, articles 142 and 157 may have some relevance. On the
General Principles being insufficiently detailed, see Jiao, supra note 28, at 3.
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American system of competing claims and contingency fees. 90 Of course,
while the system in New Zealand may excel at reducing conflicts that arise
between equal subjects because of injuries and accidents, it would do little to
solve assaults on personhood from above.
Moreover, if persons are to bring successful actions against government
agencies under the Administrative Procedure Law, then (setting aside for the
moment the question of a conducive political environment) they will probably
need the assistance of lawyers. 9' Lawyers in China, however, not only are
relatively scarce,92 but they are also infrequently involved in litigation. An
article in the summer of 1989 asserted that in the majority of the one million
civil cases tried by Chinese courts the previous year, there was no
representation by lawyers. 93 Still, there is an assumption that lawyers shall be
involved in administrative litigation, for articles 29 and 30 of the new law
specifically provide for their participation.
The problem is that even before June 4, as the Minister of Justice himself
admitted, the Lawyers Regulations' definition of lawyers as the state's legal
workers led people to distrust them. 94 The establishment of cooperatives of
lawyers in the spring of 198895 did not change lawyers' status, and the next
possible step, the creation of an independent profession of private attorneys,
was vehemently opposed by some commentators as antithetical to Chinese
socialist legalism. 9 6 While an independent profession might be more trusted
by its clients, deeply rooted habits continue to impede lawyers' work
regardless of how their firms are organized. Local justice bureaus demand
that lawyers obtain their permission before pleading clients' defenses; courts
determine whether to proceed with trials on the basis of instructions from
senior local officials rather than sufficiency of evidence; and local judges settle
economic disputes between residents and outsiders on the basis of
relationships (guanxi) rather than law. One judge told a lawyer that he was
not about "to let the rich water flow to the fields of an outsider." 97
Reform of the lawyers system continued to be discussed through the
summer of 1989, but the prospect of truly private lawyers had faded. Law
firms, like property, could take on three different forms-state, collective, and
individual (geti)-but in terms of their political attributes, lawyers were all
90. Palmer, Accident Compensation in New Zealand: The First Two Years, 25 AM.J. COMP. L. 1 (1977);
Gellhorn, Medical Malpractice Litigation (U. S. )--Medical Mishap Compensation (N. Z.), 73 CORNELL L. REv.
170 (1988).
91. For an excellent recent review of the legal profession in China, see Pitney, supra note 1.
92. A former Minister ofJustice in 1987 pegged the number at 30,000, id. at 332 n.61, but the
figure given in an 1989 article on lawyers was 27,000, Li ZhonggUo hishi de lu (The Path of Chinese
Lawyers), Legal System Daily, July 20, 1989, at 3.
93. Li, supra note 92.
94. Pitney, supra note 1, at 376.
95. Li, supra note 92. Such firms were established in Baoding (south of Beijing), Shanghai,
Guangzhou, Tianjin, and Beijing.
96. Zhao, Dui ltiXhi tizhi gaigede liangdian renshi (Two Points on Understanding the Reform of the Lawyer
System), Legal System Daily, June 2, 1989, at 3.
97. Li, supra note 92.
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state legal workers. 98 Speaking to the Chinese Bar Association's Board of
Directors on September 11, 1989, Minister of Justice Cai Cheng made no
distinctions between political and economic attributes. All lawyers, he told his
audience, were socialist legal workers serving "under the administration and
leadership of the Party and government" as clearly provided in the
Provisional Rules on Lawyers.99 In light of this instruction, complainants
filing suits against other persons (legal or natural) may still retain some
confidence in a lawyer's ability to prosecute their cases vigorously. However,
complainants (both legal and natural persons) under the Administrative
Procedure Law, if they dare to invoke its provisions at all, may have profound
misgivings about precisely whose interests a lawyer represents.
IV
CONCLUSION
In their postscripts, several of the contributors to this volume make short-
term prognoses of varying degrees of pessimism. Feinerman writes that
"[p]olitical and programmatic concerns will decide the course and the speed
of progress, with economic phenomena forced to conform to their dictates,
rather than proceeding organically from the natural evolution of a dynamic
economy."' 0 0 Bill Jones finds little prospect of a role for civil law in a
centralized economy but, recalling the evidence of disregard for central
authorities and the persistence of private economic activity during the
Cultural Revolution, is reluctant to abandon all hope for improvement. And
Edward Epstein concludes that as the role of the market undergoes
reassessment, civil law may "be supplanted by economic law, marking the
reascendancy of the public economy."'' Indeed, Epstein shows that even
before June 4, the way the State Enterprise Law defined enterprise property
rights constituted a rejection of the theories of relative ownership that
scholars had been trying to construct as a foundation for greater enterprise
autonomy and for alternatives to state ownership.
Some American economists argue that the key to energizing socialist
economies is an efficient market, not the reform or dismantling of public
ownership. "Markets do not require the privatization of public property,"
writes John Roemer, 10 2 for private ownership is no panacea. "Workers and
managers are not inspired to perform in capitalist firms by virtue of owning a
share of the profits." Efficient markets, which in China would require the
elimination of regional barriers to trade, will "bring good managers to the
fore." They, then, will develop the forces of production, thereby attaining
98. Xiao, Ldshi tizhi gaigede kunhuo yu xuanze (Predicaments and Choices in the Reform of the Lawyer
System), Legal System Daily, September 11, 1989, at 3.
99. Xu, WVugu0 lishi dou shi shehui :huyifalugongzuozhe (Our Lawyers are all Socialist Legal Workers), id.
at 1.
100. Feinerman, supra note 40, at 184.
101. Epstein, supra note 17, at 216.
102. Roemer, Incentives and Agency in Socialist Economies (forthcoming in EcoN. & PHILOSOPHY).
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Marx's goal of improving people's material condition. In the context of this
analysis, some degree of centralization would arguably facilitate implementing
the policy of "state-regulated markets, market-led enterprises" advocated by
civil proponents, 0 3 with the focus on key publicly owned enterprises desired
by economic conservatives such as Prime Minister Li Peng.' 0 4 Yet, as Joshua
Cohen and Joel Rogers observed in response to Roemer's work, one must not
neglect the issue of control.' 0 5 For them, "public ownership of the means of
production is centrally about the extension of democracy to the economy, the
setting of the terms of economic order through processes of public
deliberation among free and equal citizens. . . . [T]he principal role of
[democratic] ideals is in characterizing the proper arrangements for actually making
and implementing collective decisions, and the appropriate background conditions for
deliberative decision-making by free and equal citizens."
Unfortunately, China remains a profoundly hierarchical society. As
Michael Walzer puts it, "in a hierarchical society, one can praise or blame
equals and inferiors, but recognitions of superiority must be unqualified."'' 0 6
In China, those so privileged are Party and government leaders, an inequality
that provoked much of the student and popular ire in the spring 1989
demonstrations. On June 13, 1989, a remarkably frank article in Fazhi ribao
employed the traditional technique of holding the past up as a mirror for the
present to make the point that China lacked a civil law tradition because the
"old China" was autocratic. Civil law embodied democratic politics, but the
precondition for society's self-rule was individual self-rule. '0 7 Another article
on August 24 echoed some of these sentiments, asserting that there could be
no legal construction until the persistent "feudal legacy" of the "ideology of
privilege" (tequan sixiang) had been expunged. 0 8
The system of privilege in socialist China, of course, is not simply a
remnant but is a construction of the present society as well. Both before and
afterJune 4, commentators lamented that the law lacked the strength either to
resolve the disorder in the economy or to control the corrupt power that
privilege produced. Rule of law could displace rule of man but only if there
were no higher authority than the law. China for the moment, however, lacks
a mechanism to restrict abuse of power. Indeed, much of the abuse comes
from government workers in supervisory capacities. 0 9 Perhaps the chief
103. Chen, supra note 75; Tong,Jianli shehui zhuyi shangpinjingii xin zhivude guanjian shifazhijianshe
(The Key to Establishing the New Order of Socialist Commodities Economy is Legal Construction), STUDIES IN LAW
I (No. 6, 1988).
104. Jin, supra note 64.
105. Cohen & Rogers, Public Ownership: Comments on Roemer, at 2, 3 (prepared for delivery at
the Conference for the Study of Political Thought 1989 International Meeting, "Markets and
Political Theory," April 28-29, 1989, and cited with the permission of the authors).
106. M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 250 (1983).
107. Zhou & Zhou, supra note 68.
108. Liu, Fazhi yu tequan (Lau, and Privilege), Legal System Daily. August 24. 1989, at 3.
109. Gao, Chedi paoqi renzhi, shulifalii quanwei (Completely Reject Rule by Alan and Establish the Authority
of Law). Legal System Daily, February 27, 1989, at I; Ai,Jianli shangpingjingji xin zhiu xu yao qianghna
xingzhengjiancha tizhi (To Establish the Veu, Order of Commodity Economy Requires Strengthening the System of
Administrative Supervision), id., May 3, 1989, at 3; Li, supra note 67.
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reason China lacks such a mechanism is that, to paraphrase Feinerman's
remark about the economy, its statist political order will not allow any new
actor to emerge in the polity without explicit authorization from the state.
Thus, as political theorist Su Shaozhi' ° has pointed out, there are no
acknowledged blocs or interest groups within the Party, much less a
countervailing force to the Party in society as a whole. Unlike Poland or
Czechoslovakia, there are no organizations like the Church, Solidarity, or
Group 77.
As Fang Liufang observes in his conclusion, China's effort to build
socialism with Chinese characteristics sometimes leads to a "weaving together
of strictly orthodox ideological dogmatism and flexible realism."''' In the
political sphere, this approach translates into a reluctance to permit truly
representative socialist democracy combined with a willingness to create
ersatz institutions. I use "ersatz" in the sense of substitute rather than false.
Thus, such undertakings as "supervision by public opinion" and the
Administrative Procedure Law are not shams and in fact may serve to halt
specific abuses and redress particular grievances. However, they were not
intended to, and hence are incapable of, addressing root causes.
This dogmatist/realist amalgam produces spheres of relative rule of law.
In the realm of personal or human rights, that is, of speech, expression, and
assembly, the interests of the state and Party are more manifest and the law
more responsive to them. For example, in some respects the recently
promulgated PRC Law on Meetings, Marches, and Demonstrations" 2 is not
unreasonable in its requirement that organizers indicate to the police on their
permit request the time, location, and route of the activity. 113 Yet, it also
requires the organizers to give the police advance notice of the content of
their posters and slogans' 4 and to abide by the posters and slogans
authorized in the permit.' 15 If unapproved language is used and not halted
when so ordered by the authorities, organizers may be warned or detained for
up to fifteen days,'16 unless the refusal to halt and disperse "seriously
damages" (yangepohuai) public order, in which case the organizer may, under
article 158 of the Criminal Code, be punished by deprivation of his political
rights and/or other punishment up to five years in prison.'' 7 If the activity
has resulted in damage to public or private property or in personal injuries,
parade organizers must bear the appropriate civil liabilities in addition to any
110. Su, supra note 64.
111. Fang, supra note 22, at 66.
112. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jihui, youxing, shiwei fa, GUOWUYUAN GONGBAO (BULL. STATE
COUNCIL) 803 (No. 2, Nov. 25, 1989). On June 30, 1989, the Standing Committee of the State
Council submitted a draft version to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, id.
at 809, which in turn passed the law on October 31, 1989, id. at 803.
113. PRC Law on Meetings, Marches, and Demonstrations, art. 8.
114. Id.
115. Id. art. 25.
116. Id. art. 28, § 2.2.
117. Id. art. 29, § 3. The relevant provisions from the Criminal Code are appended.
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administrative or criminal penalties.' I8 Law here is in the service of the four
fundamental principles: the leadership of the Communist Party, the road to
socialism, Marxist-Leninist-Maoist Thought, and the people's democratic
dictatorship.
In the realm of the civil rights of the person-natural and legal-the
influence of state and Party policy continues to affect the legal process, but
rule of law holds greater sway than elsewhere. Litigation about product
liability, personal injury, right to reputation, right to likeness, medical
malpractice, and breach of contract continues apace. To the extent that the
law can protect the rights encompassed in this sphere against cruder
interventions from above and can handle the disputes between equal subjects
within this sphere with a measure of both procedural and substantive justice,
people will begin to view law as something more than an instrument of public
order. In his remarks on "rule of law" at the close of Whigs and Hunters, E.P.
Thompson makes a similar argument. Because law mediates horizontal
relations as well as vertical class ones, it acquires an independence and logic
of its own that makes its use amenable to subordinate social groups, despite
their awareness that it sometimes also oppresses them. Law, then, also
ultimately constrains the ruling groups, for it can be directed upward, albeit
more feebly, as well as downward.'' 9 Through use, law acquires a potency
and legitimacy of its own.
My belief that the more extensive practice of rule of law in the latter
sphere will eventually spread to or at least impinge on the former rests on
several foundations, some more concrete than others. First, the enterprise of
scholarship in the civil law proceeds. Certain topics may temporarily become,
as the Chinese say, "forbidden zones," but much important theoretical and
practical work can be accomplished. Second, as someone whose professional
career is based on the study of traditional and modern law, especially in
China, I find it difficult to accept the conclusion that this important topic will
become arid. Third, like people who are reluctant to relinquish power once
they have it, those who have become accustomed, even in a minor way, to rule
of law will want to retain it. In 1983, I asked a fifty-year-old Beijing carpenter,
with whom I had a chance encounter, what he thought of the harsh treatment
being meted out to youth gangs. He expressed his approval, for he said it had
made the streets safe at night for his daughter. Then he thought a moment
and added, "The danger is that once an official gets a new rule or a new
power, even for a temporary purpose, he'll find a way to keep using it so he
won't have to let it go." Perhaps I am a pollyanna. But I would like to think
that ordinary Chinese will find a way to keep using the vibrant body of civil
law they still have so they won't have to let it go.
118. Id. art. 32.
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